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Abstract 
 
We investigated how the emotional valence of an action outcome influences the 
experience of control, in an intentional binding experiment. Voluntary actions were followed 
by emotionally positive or negative human vocalisations, or by neutral tones. We used mental 
chronometry to measure a retrospective component of sense of agency (SoA), triggered by 
the occurrence of the action outcome, and a prospective component, driven by the 
expectation that the outcome will occur. Positive outcomes enhanced the retrospective 
component of SoA, but only when both occurrence and the valence of the outcome were 
unexpected. When the valence of outcomes was blocked –and therefore predictable– we 
found a prospective component of SoA when neutral tones were expected but did not actually 
occur.  This prospective binding was absent, and reversed, for positive and negative expected 
outcomes. Emotional expectation counteracts the prospective component of SoA, suggesting 
a distancing effect. 
 
 Keywords: Sense of agency, Intentional Binding, Valence, Emotion, Retrospective, 
Prospective 
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Emotional valence, sense of agency and responsibility: a study using intentional binding 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Sense of agency is the experience of control over our own voluntary actions, and, through 
them, events in the outside world. Sense of agency is a core feature of normal mental life, at 
least in healthy adult humans, and a prerequisite of a well-functioning society. For example, 
legal systems assume that we will always know whether we have caused an event or not, 
because we experience our actions, and, at least partly, understand their consequences, at the 
time that we make them. Other things being equal, a defendant who has a sense of agency 
regarding the appropriate action is expected to plead guilty, and one who does not is expected 
to plead not guilty to the appropriate charge.  
If the sense of agency perfectly tracked the facts of agency, there would never be doubt 
about who caused a particular outcome, and was thereby responsible. However, the sense of 
agency is limited for several reasons. First, sense of agency does not perfectly track the 
objective facts of agency.  For example, a person may make an action and cause an outcome, 
but not realise they have done so. One reason for this gap between objective and subjective 
agency is limited cognitive capacity: people clearly cannot foresee all the consequences of 
their own actions. Here we focus on a different limitation, namely the strong biasing effect of 
affective valence on sense of agency. These effects are often considered under the label self-
serving bias (Heider, 1958; Bandura, 1982; Bradley, 1978). People attribute positive actions 
and outcomes to themselves, while distancing themselves from bad actions and outcomes, 
notably by attributing them to others. Previous studies of such biases have used a framework 
of attribution judgement to consider these biases, often within the social context of praise and 
blame. 
However, the relation between such social judgements of agency, and the primary 
experience of agency, remains unclear. This issue is important, since people often know from 
direct experience that they are responsible for an outcome, yet then explicitly attribute 
responsibility to another (e.g., “passing the buck”, “only obeying orders”; Miller, 1947, 
2009). Such psychological phenomena imply a basic, pre-attributional experience of agency, 
which is sensitive to valence. However, this experience, and its valence-sensitivity have 
proved difficult to measure scientifically, resulting in a knowledge gap in the literature on 
psychology of agency and responsibility. 
Here we have used action binding (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002; Moore & Obhi, 
2012) as an implicit measure of sense of agency. The perceived time of a voluntary self-
generated action is shifted towards the action’s outcome, as compared to a condition where 
the action is not followed by a sensory outcome. There is also a corresponding shift in the 
perceived time of the outcome back towards the action that caused it. 
Yoshie & Haggard (2013) compared intentional binding for actions which predictably 
had either positive, negative or neutral sounds as their outcomes. Binding was reduced for 
negative action outcomes as compared to positive ones. This implies a stronger sense of 
agency over positive compared to negative events, consistent with the concept of a self-
serving bias (Bandura, 1984), and/or a distancing from negative outcomes as a form of 
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reappraisal mechanism (Ochsner, Bunge, Cross, Gabrieli, 2002). Takahata et al. (2012) 
obtained similar results in the context of a gambling task. Different tones were first 
associated with either positive or negative outcomes of one’s own action (gains or losses). 
Subsequent intentional binding measures showed less binding, implying reduced sense of 
agency, for tones that had previously been associated with losses, compared to rewards. 
The experience of agency over an outcome could be based on predicting the outcome 
(e.g., I feel in control of my bicycle, because I predict that turning the handlebars will change 
my direction), or on inferring retrospectively the consequences of my own actions (e.g., I win 
money because I gambled. Although the stakes were 50-50 my winning makes me 
retrospectively attribute the winning to my skill in choosing) (Moore & Haggard, 2008). It 
remains unclear whether valence effects on sense of agency are primarily prospective, or 
primarily retrospective. In previous studies (Yoshie and Haggard, 2013), the valence of an 
action was entirely predictable, since participants generated positive, negative or neutral 
outcome sounds in separate blocks. In this situation, both prospective and retrospective 
components can contribute to sense of agency, but cannot be specifically disentangled. In 
Takahata et al. (2012), the valence of the outcome was randomised, and therefore 
unpredictable. In their results, outcome valence influenced sense of agency retrospectively. 
However, it remains unclear whether valence can also influence prospective sense of agency. 
This issue has important implications. Purely retrospective valence effects imply a failure 
to feel responsible for actions with negative outcomes. This would be highly adaptive in 
ensuring well-being, but would have catastrophic implications for society. A well-functioning 
society, at least one similar to our own, presupposes that individuals avoid making actions 
with negative outcomes, even when these actions are superficially tempting. Presumably, 
individuals learn from previous experience the relation between actions and negative 
outcomes, and then use these experiences to prospectively guide future agency. A genuine, 
valence-sensitive experience of agency at the time of an action therefore plays an important 
role in minimising future harmful actions.  
Moore and Haggard (2008) proposed an experimental design to distinguish the influence 
of prospective and retrospective mechanisms on sense of agency, based on manipulating 
outcome probabilities. The probability of producing an outcome is set to 50% in one block of 
the experiment, and to 75% in another (Moore & Haggard, 2008; Voss, et al., 2010). An 
estimate of the retrospective component of sense of agency is obtained by comparing the 
binding of action towards tones on those trials in the 50% block where a tone does occur, 
with those trials where it does not. An estimate of the prospective component is obtained by 
comparing the binding of actions towards tones on trials where tones do not in fact occur, but 
are more likely (i.e., 75% block), compared to less likely (i.e., 50% block). Prediction should 
clearly be stronger in the 75% block than in the 50% block, although it is not total in the 
former, nor absent in the latter – thus the design affords a partial estimate of the prospective 
component, rather than a perfect measure. Nevertheless, comparing estimates for prospective 
or retrospective components between groups (Voss et al., 2010), or between different 
conditions may clarify whether a particular factor influences prospective or reconstructive 
components of sense of agency. 
We investigated how the valence of an action outcome would influence the retrospective 
and prospective components of sense of agency. The probability of producing an action 
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outcome was either highly likely (75%) or moderately likely (50%), and retrospective and 
prospective components of action binding were calculated. In Group 1, outcome valence was 
unpredictable, because positive, negative and neutral sounds were randomised. This means 
that for this group, the valence of the outcome, if it occurred, was experienced anew on each 
trial. This allowed us to assess whether the outcome valence of an action modulates sense of 
agency retrospectively. In Group 2, the same outcome sounds were blocked, so that the 
valence of the sound was always predictable, though its occurrence could be more or less 
predictable, as before (50% or 75%). With this we sought to establish whether the prospective 
component of sense of agency would emerge if the valence of the outcome, as well as its 
occurrence, were predictable. 
Our general research question was whether outcome valence influences the prospective or 
the retrospective part of sense of agency, and whether this influence depended on valence 
itself being predictable.  
 
2. Method 
 
2.1.Participants 
 
A total of 56 right-handed volunteers (30 male) participated in the experiment in 
exchange for a small time reimbursement (£7.50/h). They were randomly assigned to the two 
conditions (randomised, unpredictable emotion trials, vs. blocked, predictable emotion trials); 
Group 1 (28; 14 male; mean age = 23.54, SD = 4.53) and Group 2 (28; 16 male; mean age = 
24.25, SD = 5.49). Emotion predictability was used as a between rather than within subjects 
factor, largely because a within subjects approach would have shown an order effect (once 
emotions are predicted, they may continue to be predicted, even after they become 
unpredictable). All participants were of European Linguistic background to match the actors 
of the vocal sound stimuli. 
To determine the sample size of the two groups, we performed two power calculations, 
using GPower 3.1. (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) for two contrasts of interest. 
First we determined the sample size necessary to identify a significant effect of emotion 
within a single group (effect size = .80; alpha = .05; power = .90). This gave a suggested 
sample size of 15. In addition, we also planned to compare the group receiving blocked 
emotion outcomes with the group receiving randomized emotion outcomes. For this, we 
performed an additional power calculation for an independent samples t-test (effect size = 
.80; alpha = .05; power = .90). This gave a suggested sample size of 28 per group. The total 
sample size was fixed based on this second power calculation.	
 
2.2. Procedure 
 
An Intentional Binding task was used as an implicit measure of sense of agency 
(Haggard, et al., 2002; Libet, et al., 1983). Participants were seated in front of a computer 
screen with an external silent SODIAL(R) Flexible Foldable USB keyboard in front of them 
to provide their responses on. At each trial, participants were instructed to press a key 
[ENTER] on this keyboard at the time of their choosing (= the moment they felt the urge to 
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do so) while they looked at the centre of a clock which was displayed on the screen with a 
continuously rotating clock hand. The clock was ~2x2 cm large and the clock hand 12mm, 
rotating about a clock face with the common numbers 5….10….15 etc., at a rate of 2,560 
milliseconds (ms). After the key press, after a fixed duration of 250 ms a tone occurred. This 
brief interval between action and tone gave participants the impression of causing the tone. 
The clock hand continued rotating for a random amount of time, then stopped. At this time, 
participants were prompted to state verbally where the clock hand was in the moment they 
pressed the key. The experimenter entered the number on a different keyboard and launched 
the next trial.  
In the classical action binding procedure, the binding measure is obtained by 
calculating the difference in estimation accuracy between the following two conditions: first, 
the participant performs this task in a baseline condition where no tone occurs. In the operant 
condition, they generate the tone by their own voluntary action. Their judgment “shifts” 
towards the tone, signalling that the outcome of their action (the tone) modulated their 
temporal estimation of the time of the action. This difference between baseline and operant 
conditions is defined as “action binding”, and serves as a proxy for sense of agency.  
In order to give the action outcomes different affective significance, three types of 
emotional sounds were selected, following previous empirical work (Yoshie & Haggard, 
2013). Eight emotional sounds were selected from an extensively-normed database of 
nonverbal emotional vocal sounds (Sauter, Eisner, Calder, & Scott, 2010). There were four 
sounds with positive valence (two sounds of laughter and two of achievement), and four of 
negative valence (two of disgust and two of fear). In addition, four neutral “beep”-tones were 
generated to be used as a neutral comparison condition. This resulted in a total of 12 outcome 
sounds, of three different valence significance. Subjective ratings from an independent group 
of participants in a previously published study confirmed this classification of the sounds as 
positive and negative, and also verified matching for pitch and duration; see supplementary 
material of Yoshie & Haggard, 2013).  
Prospective and retrospective processes in sense of agency can be investigated using 
the intentional binding paradigm by varying the outcome probability across two conditions, 
one 50% and one 75% condition (Moore & Haggard, 2008; Voss, et al., 2010). The same 
procedure was followed here. See figure 1 for an illustration of the basic trial structure.  
 
Figure 1. Trial structure.  
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Participants performed a total of 240 trials. Both groups started with an action 
baseline block (48 trials). Group 1 (randomised unpredictable emotion group) subsequently 
went through 4 blocks of 48 trials. In 2 of the blocks the sound occurrence predictability was 
50% (in only 50% of the trials a sound actually occurred) and in another 2 blocks sound 
occurrence predictability was 75% (in 75% of the trials a sound occurred). In the 50% 
predictability condition participants had a total of 16 negative, 16 positive and 16 neutral 
sound outcomes (=48), and a further 48 trials with no sound outcome (randomised across 2 
blocks, with equal numbers of each trial type in each block). In the 75% predictability 
condition participants had 24 stimuli of each valence (72 trials) plus 24 trials with no sound 
outcome (randomised across 2 blocks, equal number of trials of each in each block). This 
means a total of 96 in each of the 2 conditions (=192), plus 48 from the baseline condition 
(=240 in total). 
There were two groups of participants.  Group 2 (the predictable blocked emotion 
group) received the same number of stimuli of each kind as the group in Group 1. To allow 
the blocked paradigm, however, the stimuli were arranged as follows: participants in Group 2 
performed 3 shorter blocks of 32 stimuli for each of the two outcome probabilities (50% and 
75%), 6 in total; 2 for each valence (negative, neutral, positive). In each of these blocks, there 
were 16 stimuli of the respective valences and 16 without any sound (50% condition), or 24 
of each valence and 8 without sound outcome (75% condition). This resulted in 32 trials in 6 
blocks (=192) plus the 48 from the baseline (=240 in total). In both experiments, blocks were 
counterbalanced between participants but participants always performed either the 50% or the 
75%. Participants always performed the baseline condition first, then followed by the blocks 
of the experiment, in counterbalanced order. See figure 2 for an illustration of the procedure 
and table 1 for the design.  
 
Figure 2. Schematic representation of the procedure. (A) Voluntary actions are followed by 
an outcome sound (beep) 250ms later. This produces a shift in the perceived time of the 
action (dotted arrow). (B) In one block, the probability of a sound given an action is 50%. 
Binding toward outcome is compared between trials with and without outcome sound. This 
identifies the retrospective component of action binding. (C) In another block, the probability 
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given an action is 75%. Comparing action binding on trials across the two probability blocks 
where no outcomes occur, reveals how outcome binding varies with the degree of prediction.  
 
Table 1 
The experimental design was based on the factorial combination of two factors. Outcome 
occurrence was a within-subjects factor, referring to whether the outcome was more (75%) or 
less (50%) likely. Outcome valence was a between-subjects factor, and was either 
unpredictable (Group 1) or predictable (Group 2).  
 
 OUTCOME OCCURENCE 
Less Predictable More Predictable 
VALENCE Probability of sound given 
an action = 50% 
Probability of sound given 
an action = 75% 
 
 
UNPREDICTABLE 
(GROUP 1) 
No Sound 50% 
No Sound 25% 
Sound 75% 
Sound 50% 
 
 
PREDICTABLE 
(GROUP 2) 
No Sound 50% 
No Sound 25% 
Sound 75% 
Sound 50% 
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To ensure participants would not ignore the sounds’ emotional significance, 
participants were informed that a few randomly interleaved “extra questions” would appear 
throughout the experiment, asking them to state whether the sound they just heard was 
positive or negative (this question was never asked after a neutral beep). Participants were 
told they would receive a bonus (25 pence) for each correct answer in addition to their normal 
payment. There were 10 such trials throughout each experiment. Participants in both groups 
generally judged between 8 and 10 of these trials correctly (average: 9.80; SD 1.10). One 
outlier scored only 2/10.  
 
2.3. Statistical analyses 
 
We calculated a retrospective and a prospective component of action binding, following 
previous studies (Moore & Haggard, 2008), and we analysed these components separately. 
The retrospective component of action binding was calculated as the difference in action 
binding in the 50% occurrence probability condition between trials where there was an 
outcome sound and trials where there was no outcome sound. For Experiment 1 the no sound 
trials were averaged across all three valences, as these trials were presented at random and 
could not be allocated to any specific valence. For Experiment 2, each valence was presented 
in a separate block, and we therefore used the no sound trials from the relevant block to 
calculate the retrospective component: (positive outcome)-(no outcome in the positive block), 
(negative outcome)-(no outcome in the negative block), and (neutral outcome)-(no outcome 
in the neutral block). 
 The prospective component was calculated by subtracting the average action binding in 
the no sound trials of the 50% condition from the average action binding effect in the no 
sound trials of the 75% condition.   The prospective component therefore captures the extent 
to which action binding depends on the probability of the outcome, given the action. 
A Repeated Measures design was used with separate blocks of judgments of action with 
outcome sound valence as within-subjects factor (negative, neutral or positive) and 
predictability of outcome valence as between-subjects factor (unpredictable; Group 1, vs. 
predictable; Group 2). Specifically, in Group 1 emotional outcomes were fully randomised to 
create circumstances of fully unpredictable emotional outcomes. In Group 2 the emotional 
outcomes were blocked into separate blocks of predictably negative, neutral or positive 
outcomes.  
As effect sizes we report partial eta (ηp²), where .01 is considered a small effect size, .06 a 
medium effect and .14 a large effect, and Cohen’s d for t-tests (Cohen, 1988).  
 
 
3. Results 
 
The data are shown in table 2.  
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Table 2 
Results of experiments 1 and 2. Values are rounded to the nearest ms. 
 
 
 
 Group 1  
(unpredictable emotion trials) 
Group 2  
(predictable emotion trials) 
CONDITIONS Outcome Mean SD Mean SD 
      
Baseline - -36 57 7 58 
      
Probability of Sound 50%     
 No outcome (average) 28 69 0 60 
 No outcome –negative N/A1 N/A 15 83 
 No outcome –neutral  N/A N/A -6 56 
 No outcome –positive N/A N/A 13 52 
 Negative outcome 40 72 -2 70 
 Neutral outcome 29 71 10 56 
 Positive outcome 44 68 -9 70 
      
Probability of Sound 75%     
 No outcome (average) 28 71 1 53 
 No outcome –negative N/A N/A -1 62 
 No outcome –neutral  N/A N/A 12 55 
 No outcome –positive N/A N/A -1 58 
 Negative outcome 35 73 14 65 
 Neutral outcome 28 62 18 63 
 Positive outcome 26 76 1 64 
      
Retrospective component      
 Negative outcome 11 36 -17 78 
 Neutral outcome 1 35 24 65 
 Positive outcome 16 26 -22 65 
     
Prospective component      
 Average over outcomes 0 29 0 41 
 Negative outcome N/A N/A -16 72 
 Neutral outcome N/A N/A 18 46 
 Positive outcome N/A N/A -13 55 
1 These values cannot be calculated for Group 1 because the emotional sounds were randomised across trials and thus the “no sound” trials cannot be 
attributed to any specific emotional valence condition.  
 
Our analyses focussed on the retrospective and prospective components, rather than 
the individual cell means. The results are shown in figure 3. The Retrospective component 
was analysed using a mixed Repeated Measures ANOVA with between-subjects factor of 
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predictability of outcome valence (unpredictable, vs. predictable), and a within-subjects 
factor of outcome sound valence (negative, neutral or positive). We found no significant 
effect of either factor (predictability: F(2,53) = 2.425, p = .125, η2 =.043; outcome valence: 
F(2,53) = 1.638, p = .199, η2 = .029), but a significant interaction between these factors (F 
(2,53) = 5.581, p = .005, η2 = .094). Simple effects tests were used to explore this interaction. 
First, we compared the groups receiving predictable and unpredictable valence of outcome 
sounds, for each outcome sound individually. There was no difference between these groups 
for the neutral outcome sound (t(54) = -1.631, p = .109, ns). However, the groups did differ 
for the negative (t(54) = 1.743, p = .087, d = .46) and for positive sounds (t(54) = 2.835, p = 
.006, d = .77). Action binding was stronger when these sounds were unpredictable (Group 1), 
compared to predictable (Group 2). In addition, we also used simple effects to explore 
differences between the different valences of outcome sounds within each group. In group 1 
for whom outcome valence was unpredictable, we found more binding for positive than for 
neutral sounds (t(27) = 2.069, p = .048, d = .48). No such difference was found between 
positive and negative sounds (t(27) = -.588, p = .562, ns), nor between negative and neutral 
sounds (t(27) = 1.407, p = .171, ns). In group 2, for whom outcome valence was predictable, 
we found a significant difference in action binding between negative and neutral sounds 
(t(27) = -2.388, p = .024, d = .57), and between positive and neutral sounds (t(27) = 2.779, p 
= .010, d = .70), though in the opposite direction as compared to group 1. Group 2 showed 
less action binding for negative and positive outcomes, as compared to neutral outcomes.  
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Figure 3. Retrospective component of sense of agency. See text for explanation. Error bars 
represent S.E.M. * p < .05. ϯ p < .10
 
 
The prospective component could not be analysed factorially. In the condition where 
valence of outcome sounds was blocked (Group 2), we could compare the prospective 
components for each valence condition. However, in the condition where valence of outcome 
sounds was randomised (Group 1) and therefore unpredictable, we cannot assign individual 
no-sound trials to any particular valence condition, and could therefore not calculate a 
prospective component for each valence. We therefore performed two separate analyses. 
First, we used a between-subjects t-test to compare groups receiving unpredictable or 
predictable valence of outcome sounds, averaging over the different outcome sound valences 
in the latter case. There was no significant difference between the groups (t(54) = -.067, p = 
.947, ns). Second, for the predictable valence group (Group 2) only, we used a one-way 
ANOVA to compare how valence influenced the prospective component. This showed a 
significant overall effect of outcome sound valence (F(2,27) = 3.195, p = .049, η2 =.106. 
Follow-up t-tests showed significant differences between the prospective component when a 
negative sound might be predicted compared to when a neutral sounds might be predicted 
(t(27) = -2.424, p = .022, d = .75), and between the prospective component when a positive 
sound might be predicted compared to when a neutral sound might be predicted (t(27) = -
2.359, p = .026, d = .62). The difference between negative and positive conditions was not 
significant (t(27) = -.157, p = .876, ns). No correction for multiple comparisons was 
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performed: when omnibus ANOVA shows a difference between three conditions, subsequent 
pairwise comparisons do not use additional degrees of freedom (Cardinal & Aitken, 2006).  
 
Figure 4. Prospective component of sense of agency. See text for explanation. Error bars represent 
S.E.M. * p < .05. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Discussion 
  
We have investigated the relation between the valence of an outcome and the sense of 
agency in a laboratory experiment with healthy adult volunteers. Previous work on agency-
valence relations has traditionally been dominated by the pervasive concept of self-serving 
bias. This implies enhanced sense of agency for positive outcomes, and a distancing, or 
reduced sense of agency for negative outcomes (Bandura, 1984). Crucially, our method 
combined a number of innovations relative to previous work: we used an implicit proxy 
measure of sense of agency, we distinguished between prospective and retrospective 
components of sense of agency, and we used naturalistic human vocalisations as action 
outcomes, ensuring a basic affective valence because of the emotional nature of these sounds. 
Our study generated three main findings. First, unexpectedly positive outcomes enhanced 
the retrospective sense of agency. Second, when the valence of an outcome was expected, 
this retrospective effect was abolished, and in fact reversed –for both positive and negative 
outcomes. Third, the prospective component of sense of agency was enhanced when a neutral 
outcome was expected, compared to when a positive or negative outcome was expected. 
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Conversely, when there was no expectation regarding the valence of an outcome, the 
prospective component of sense of agency was reduced. 
In principle, the negative scores found for prospective and retrospective components of 
action binding in group 1 and 2 could be due to some process other than affective modulation 
of sense of agency by action outcome. For example, in group 2, the predictable emotional 
valence of each action might favour learning time perception. However, participants never 
get feedback, so the opportunities for learning are limited. Therefore we disregard this 
interpretation of the current results.   
Our results may reflect two qualitatively different interactions between the neurocognitive 
systems for emotion and for action. The first of these might be called agentic serendipity. 
When outcomes were (a) relatively unlikely, (b) of unpredictable valence, and (c) happened 
to be positive, we found a significant increase in the binding of an action towards the sound. 
We interpret this as a retrospective boost of sense of agency, consistent with self-serving bias 
(Heider, 1958; Bandura, 1984). Importantly, the conditions for this effect occurring are 
relatively restrictive: the effect was absent for unexpectedly negative sounds, ruling out an 
effect of mere salience. Further, the effect was absent in a group of participants for whom the 
valence of the sound was predictable. Thus, we confirmed a self-serving bias in sense of 
agency, and showed that it operates retrospectively, only once the positive valence of the 
outcome is known. These findings are consistent with an inferential mechanism, which 
attributes “nice surprise” effects to one’s own voluntary agency. Interestingly, we found no 
comparable retrospective distancing effect. That is, unexpectedly negative outcomes were not 
associated with a reduced sense of agency. This may be reassuring in social and legal 
contexts: individuals are expected to accept responsibility for their actions. Even when an 
action has an unforeseen negative outcome, as in manslaughter, society still attributes the 
action to the agent. Our result suggests that this social attribution is consistent with the 
agent’s low-level perceptual experience of their action. 
Our concept of retrospective agency was based on changes in intentional binding when an 
outcome unpredictably occurred after an action, compared to when it did not. Importantly, 
however, we found that ability to predict the outcome’s valence had a clear effect, over and 
above the ability to predict its occurrence. Group 2 of our study experienced each outcome 
valence in a separate block, and could therefore predict in advance the valence of an 
outcome, if one were to occur. In this group, the actual occurrence of a sound could be more 
or less predictable, according to the block, but the valence of the sound, if it occurred, was 
always predictable. Emotional valence of an unpredictable sound reduced the sense of 
agency, both when the sound was positive and when it was negative, as compared to when it 
was neutral. That is, the retrospective component of action binding was reversed when a 
predictably positive or predictably negative vocalization occurred. Because this effect was 
equivalent in positive and negative outcome blocks, it remains unclear whether it is based on 
valence, or merely on salience. The retrospective component of agency has often been 
associated with poor understanding of the relation between one’s actions and their outcomes, 
with ‘leaping to conclusions’ about agency (Voss et al., 2010), and with uncertain contexts. 
Our results suggest these processes are reduced, rather than increased, by a stable 
emotionally-valenced context, whether positive or negative. When the valence of an outcome 
can be predicted, the tendency for emotional events to rapidly restructure experience is 
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abolished, and even reversed. Predictable, emotionally-valenced outcomes may produce a 
general emotional context, by a process similar to mood induction. While exogenous, bottom-
up positive affect can augment retrospective inferences underlying sense of agency, the 
ability to predict emotional outcomes appears to decouple sense of agency from the influence 
of actual sensory evidence about outcomes, via a kind of emotional distancing. Thus, the 
agentic serendipity effect is cancelled when valence is predictable. This result may be related 
to altered sense of agency in affective pathologies such as depression and euphoria (Alloy & 
Abrahamson, 1979; Alloy, 1988, Msetfi, Murphy, and Kornbrot, 2012; The Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders V, 2013). 
The second link between agency and valence might be called ‘cold prediction’. The 
prospective component of sense of agency was identified as an increase in binding of actions 
towards outcomes when outcome occurrence is more rather than less likely. We found no 
evidence for a prospective component when the valence of outcomes was unpredictable. 
When outcome valence was predictable we found a significant prospective component of 
binding only for neutral outcomes. In fact, greater predictability of negative or positive 
outcomes leads to less binding than lower predictability. This result suggests that sense of 
agency involves both a cold, prospective component and a warm, retrospective one. For both 
components, the negative-positive comparison is never significant, so the mechanisms seem 
to be sensitive to valence in general, that is, unsigned valence rather than signed valence. We 
recognise that unsigned valence and salience may be confounded, because positive and 
negative vocalisations may both be more salient than neutral sounds. Briefly, the prospective 
mechanism seems to be a cold and rational one: it is reduced, and even reversed when the 
affective valence can be predicted. Affect and cold prediction are thus mutually antagonistic. 
Conversely, in situations of low statistical predictability, the sense of agency appears to be 
driven by a postdictive mechanism based on positive affective surprise. This latter 
mechanism requires that both the occurrence and the valence of an action outcome be 
surprising: the effect was abolished when occurrence was unpredictable, but valence was 
predictable.  
The legal concept of responsibility for action can be linked to specific views about the 
roles of volition and cognition in psychology of action. In particular, the law assumes that 
individuals have voluntary control over their actions, and that they understand the relation 
between their action and the consequences of those actions. For example, the M’Naghten 
rules (case 1843-60 All ER Rep 229) famously ask whether an individual knows “the nature 
and quality of the act” at the time of their action. At first sight, a hypothetical individual who 
simply lacks any sense of agency could not be found guilty under these rules (though they 
could instead be found ‘criminally insane’). We have described prospective and retrospective 
aspects of sense agency. According to these concepts, an agent might not know the nature 
and quality of their act if they have lack an advance representation of their goal with which to 
guide their action control, and also lack any experience of linkage between their action and 
the actual outcome.  
At the same time, the law frequently deals with situations where intentional action, 
emotional state, and outcome valence are co-occurring and important factors. Thus, any 
influences of affective valence on sense of agency may be relevant for legal concepts of 
responsibility. In loss of control defences (Sec. 54 Coroners and Justice Act 2009), an 
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ongoing, extreme emotional state is invoked to explain an agent’s escape from normal 
voluntary control. In particular, loss of control may potentially explain why people perform 
actions with clearly negative outcomes. Our data showed that the prospective component of 
sense of agency is lost when an outcome is predictably negative, or predictably positive. We 
speculated that regular exposure to negative outcomes could cause a kind of negative mood 
induction, like a very diluted version of the depressive realism effect (Alloy & Abramson, 
1979, 1988). In extreme form, these co-occurring elements may provide a psychological 
mechanism relevant to the loss of control defence. That is, regular extreme negative 
experience, combined with reduced ability to predict and register a potential negative 
outcome of one’s own action could constitute a departure from normal sense of agency. Our 
key result is that affective context may change the experience of the nature and quality of the 
act. In particular, recurrent and predictable negative experiences appear to reduce the 
prospective sense of agency. The prospective component of sense of agency is thought to 
arise at the time of action, since it does not depend on actual outcome occurrence (Moore & 
Haggard, 2008). It may depend on the same brain processes that generate intentional actions 
(Moore, Ruge, Wenke, Rothwell, Haggard, 2010). To this extent, our study may clarify why, 
in criminal contexts, the normal cognitive mechanisms of action control seem to be replaced 
by emotionally-charged drives to action that lack the normal experiences of agency and 
responsibility. The existence of such a brain mechanism clearly does not excuse wrong doing. 
However, it does suggest that a feeling of reduced responsibility could potentially reflect an 
agent’s actual experience during emotionally-charged action. Reduced responsibility could 
correspond to a fact of human psychology, rather than a hopeful story to avoid punishment.  
Clearly, these considerations do not change the way justice should be done, but rather 
highlight features of human psychology that justice sometimes may, or may not, wish to take 
into account. 
Our study has some obvious limitations. First, it is based on an implicit proxy marker for 
sense of agency. Using implicit measure gives several advantages relative to asking 
participants to report sense of agency directly – these have been reviewed elsewhere (Jensen, 
Overgaard, di Costa & Haggard, 2015). On the other hand, intentional binding measures have 
been criticised. For example, Dewey and Knoblich (2014) noted poor correlations between 
intentional binding and explicit agency measures, and therefore suggested that these measures 
did not measure the same thing. Second, while implicit judgements may be useful in 
scientific investigations of cognitive mechanisms, their relevance for social concepts of 
responsibility is less clear. For example, the law deals largely with explicit self-reports about 
actions. Third, some of the effects in our study are relatively small, in some cases only just 
achieving the boundary of statistical significance. Replication in an additional sample would 
therefore be valuable. Fourth, the results might generalise poorly to real-life situations outside 
of the experimental laboratory. Finally, our emotional vocalisation stimuli may have been 
imperfectly designed. We could not readily match positive and negative emotional 
vocalisations for strength and recognisability. Thus, positive and negative valences may not 
have been equally convincing or successful in manipulating affect. Negative emotional 
stimuli tend to be relatively ineffective in mood induction experiments (e.g., Davis et al., 
2011), and may induce the opposite states, i.e., laughter (Levenson, 2014). More naturalistic 
stimuli or alternative mood induction methods especially for negative emotions, may support 
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a stronger claim about the link between laboratory measures of sense of agency and personal 
responsibility for action. 
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